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A breathing space for Poland

Kieler Nachrichten

...the talks between Bonn Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher and his Polish opposite number, Josef ...ek in Warsaw clarified ties between the two countries at a time of renewed ...estic tension in Poland.

...iews in Germany on ties with War... were marked by anything but com...ble tension. Government and Op...tion in Bonn were agreed on the ...n points, as they had been on aid to ...ey.

...is Mertes, a Christian Democratic ...rt on Eastern Europe in the Bun...ag, said the meeting between Herr ...scher and Mr Czyrek was only to be ...comed.

...ike fellow-Christian Democrat Wal... Leisler Kiep he was in favour of ... German bid to intensify contacts ... and aid to Poland provided it ... part of a coordinated Western ...

...must not, as had on occasion been ...case with the Social and Free ...mocratic Bonn coalition's Ostpolitik, ...an attempt to go it alone.

But leading Christian Democrats in ...nn are nonetheless wholeheartedly in ...pport of government policy towards ...land at present.

They feel Warsaw should be granted ...nomic and financial assistance pro...ded the linguistic and cultural rights ... the German minority are respected ... the Polish authorities behave more ...erously towards Poles living in West ...rmany without an official exit permit.

In other words, the Bonn Opposition ...once more prepared to accept the idea ... material assistance to Poland in re...rn for human easements.

Poland's debts to the West total ...123bn, of which Bonn is owed 30 per ...nt, according to Foreign Office state ...cretary Gunther van Well.

Economic catastrophe is imminent but Bonn, in common with other industrialised countries, is willing to help Poland out of its current economic and financial fix.

Efforts are jealously watched by the Soviet Union, which is convinced Solidarity, the free trade union, is intent on taking Poland out of the socialist camp.

The Polish Communist Party is itself showing signs of democratisation. This is perhaps hardly surprising when one bears in mind that one Solidarity member in three is also a member of the Party.

Warning strikes are heralded unless particularly autocratic Party officials resign. A renewed power struggle is in full swing.

Soviet propaganda accuses Solidarity of ties with the CIA but periodically allows that the free trade union has been responsible for progress in economic development.

This rider is presumably intended to keep the door open for possible future ties.

It is not the first time Poland has been obliged at a time of crisis to show willing on ties with Bonn, always an important issue.

A similar crisis after the fall of Mr Gomulka in 1970 led to the establishment of full diplomatic ties between Bonn and Warsaw in September 1972.

This time, however, Poland's intended economic and political rapprochement with the West runs clearly counter to Soviet interests, which was not the case in 1970.

But Soviet intentions with regard to Poland's problems are still not, in the final analysis, clearly apparent.

Polish Party leader Stanislaw Kania recently said it was not exaggerated to say that Poland's national existence was in jeopardy.

Despite lessons from Prague to Kabul it is still assumed as a matter of course in the West that for both political and economic reasons Russia dare not risk direct military intervention in Poland.

But what is to happen if Solidarity's leader Lech Walesa and Prime Minister Jaruzelski fail to reach agreement on some new controversy or other and are unable to agree to a breathing space?

There must be no forgetting the warning Mr Kania was given in Moscow, where he learnt, after talks with KGB chief Yuri Andropov, what the Soviet leaders expected.

The Polish comrades are expected to

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Bonn Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher (left), cordially welcomed to Warsaw by Henryk Jablonski, the Polish head of state, while strikes and clashes between police and demonstrators continued to upset Russia's Western neighbour. (Photo: Sven Simon)

Lambsdorff in Washington

Here seen with US Trade Secretary Malcolm Baldridge (right), Bonn Economic Affairs Minister Otto Lambsdorff was very much his usual outspoken self in Washington, telling the Reagan administration that protectionism of any kind, including self-restraint agreements, would mean trade war. (Photo: dpa)

Tension at first hand

Bremer Nachrichten

During a mere 36 hours in Warsaw Herr Genscher experienced at first hand how limited and jeopardised the stabilisation still was that the new Polish government under General Jaruzelski had brought about in its first 36 days in office.

Party leader Kania, Premier Jaruzelski and President Jablonski were still shaken by the news from Bydgoszcz, where several demonstrators were injured when police cleared an official building temporarily occupied by farmers.

Solidarity promptly called a public transport protest strike and buses and trams were not running in Warsaw that afternoon.

This experience will have shown Herr Genscher that economic aid to Poland can only hold forth promise of success if the country is allowed time for a breathing space.

During this time a climate of confidence and cooperation must be maintained, at least in Central Europe.

The question most keenly discussed by Polish observers in Warsaw during Herr Genscher's visit was what conclusions Moscow would draw from the special interests of Central and Western European countries that had been so apparent in the Polish capital.

Poland was thus anxiously looking forward to the outcome of Herr Genscher's talks in Moscow.

Gert Baumgarten

(Bremer Nachrichten, 21 March 1981)

■ **WORLD AFFAIRS**

Controversial arms deal with Saudi Arabia viewed with mixed feelings in Bonn

Seldom has another government leaned so heavily on Bonn as Saudi Arabia in its bid to buy armaments made in Germany.

What makes the affair even more intriguing is that the oil-rich desert kingdom's wish is backed to the hilt in Bonn by Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher.

Herr Genscher not only well appreciates Riyadh's desire to buy arms; he is also profoundly convinced it is right, for foreign policy reasons, to sell them.

He has just sent his fellow-Free Democrat, Bonn MP Jürgen W. Möllemann, to the Gulf to sound out prospects. He also shares President Reagan's

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view that Bonn should be more active in the area.

As an economic great power West Germany ought to engage in more political activity in the Gulf and not leave the United States to shoulder the entire burden.

Saudi Arabia cannot, for that matter, be expected to advise moderation time and again, in our interest as well as its own, without the occasional token of gratitude.

Politics is a two-way trade. In the long term you cannot take all the time and never give. Besides, a stable and traditionally pro-Western Saudi Arabia is very much in the West's interest.

So Bonn must reach a political decision without being motivated first and foremost by the undoubted blandishment of industrial orders running into the billions.

Not, of course, that order books can be forgotten entirely. So Chancellor Schmidt has little choice but to decide in favour of arms for Saudi Arabia before visiting Riyadh on 27 April.

SPD leader Willy Brandt may have strong misgivings about the deal but the Chancellor is unlikely to waver.

Assuming Bonn decides in favour of arms sales to Saudi Arabia, it will be revising its past policy of not exporting armaments to world hot spots.

So it will have to pay special attention to Israel. Both politically and morally it would be bad policy to supply arms to Riyadh without prior consultation and safeguards for Tel Aviv.

A solution readily comes to mind. Assuming Bonn would be supplying Saudi Arabia with arms in concert and in division of labour with the United States Washington could give Israel suitable guarantees in return.

Unless impressions are deceptive that is what Herr Genscher has in mind, and once again he, rather than the Chancellor, seems to be taking the lead on many key issues.

Herr Genscher, Helmut Schmidt's much-travelled deputy, has spared Bonn much trouble with his conceptual farsightedness, but he will not be able to do so on this issue.

Arms supplies, come what may, seem sure to prove a serious strain on the Bonn coalition. *Friedhelm Fiedler*

(Stuttgarter Nachrichten, 20 March 1981)

Breathing space

Continued from page 1

show the ability and the strength to reverse the course of events in their country and eliminate the danger to socialist achievements.

The Warsaw Pact was due to hold staff exercises in Poland at the end of March, which will have underscored the Kremlin's demand.

Herr Genscher and Mr Czyrek met before the German Foreign Minister's tougher talks in Moscow in early April. He will then be in a better position to judge whether Poland is likely to be granted an opportunity of putting its own house in order.

It could be that Mr Brezhnev feels he has to heed President Reagan's warnings and cannot, after Afghanistan, afford to invade a further country (not even a member-country of the Warsaw Pact).

Otherwise Poland could indeed prove to have been given a breathing-space, but no more. *Gerd Ressing*

(Rheinischer Merkur/Christ und Welt, 20 March 1981)

Cabinet raps Russia

The Bonn Cabinet has criticised with unaccustomed asperity activities by Soviet officials in the Federal Republic of Germany.

Bids by Soviet emissaries to play off public opinion against the Bonn government are evidently viewed as most annoying.

Ranking Soviet officials are indeed touring Germany and other Western countries with a view to popularising the Kremlin's policy on the Nato arms modernisation decision.

They are not only trying to undermine Nato's December 1979 Brussels resolution; they are also trying to drive a wedge between Europe and the United States.

At a Bonn book presentation ceremony Georgi Arbatov outlined to invited guests the Soviet proposal for a moratorium on the stationing of medium-range nuclear missiles in Europe.

Dealing with Bonn's views on the subject he noted, purely and simply: "The Chancellor is mistaken on this point." The Cabinet strongly denied any such allegation.

Bonn government spokesman Kurt Becker, replying to Press queries about the government's displeasure, said: "It is a matter of international practice and good manners."

He wondered what would happen if he or his deputy, Lothar Rühl, were to make similar comments in the Soviet capital.

Other Soviet officials touring the West with much the same mission include Valentin Falin, formerly ambassador to Bonn, and Leonid Samyatin, head of international information to the Soviet central committee.

Both Chancellor Schmidt and Foreign Minister Genscher are firmly resolved to abide by the Nato decision to modernise nuclear missiles in reply to the Soviet stationing of medium-range missiles in Europe for years past.

Bonn is in strict agreement on this point with its allies, especially the United States, Britain and France.

Moscow's moratorium propos[al], which the Soviet Union would lim[it it]self to its missiles already stationed, [whe]reas the West would forgo simila[r mis]siles altogether, is felt by the West [as] aimed at undermining the Nato pr[opo]sal.

In Brussels the Nato countries [decid]ed on a twofold approach of arms [mod]ernisation coupled with an offer of [...] They still favour either talks or [...] modernisation. Bonn also backs the [pro]posal for a European disarmament c[on]ference.

Not for nothing have German p[oliti]cians for some time been jetting [be]tween Bonn and Washington.

But while Cabinet Ministers and [...] government representatives [...] stress that America and Germany [...] one mind, Opposition spokesmen [...] agree.

They claim there is a much [...] consensus between America, Britain [...] France than between Washington [...] Bonn at present.

(Saarbrücker Zeitung, 19 March [...])

Kremlin tries kite-flying

It would be unrealistic to doubt for a moment that the Soviet Union is concentrating on Bonn, which it sees as the weakest link in the chain, in its bid to soften up or put paid to the December 1979 Nato missile modernisation resolve.

And it looks as though East Bloc efforts are not proving entirely unsuccessful where Social Democrats in the Bonn SPD-FDP coalition are concerned.

Not, of course, that Bonn has any intentions of forgoing the arms modernisation part of a twofold Nato decision that also included an offer of arms limitation talks with the Warsaw Pact.

Yet SPD politicians in Bonn sound a more pensive note than anyone else when Mr Brezhnev outlines new nuances of his Westpolitik such as the missile moratorium.

They seem equally impressed when the Soviet leader sends propagandists such as noted Kremlin pundit Georgi Arbatov to the Western front with suitable interpretations.

Bonn must indeed take greater care than either Washington or Paris to ensure that East-West ties do not decline to the point at which detente atrophies.

In Europe the Germans are sure to be the losers if East-West ties deteriorate. Germans on both sides of the demarcation line between Nato and the Warsaw Pact have most to lose.

The Kremlin is naturally well aware of this point, so Bonn is an obvious choice for kite-flying prior to talks between the two sides.

So Herr Genscher on his forthcoming visit to Moscow would do well to remind the Soviet Union in no uncertain terms of the conditions agreed last summer by Mr Brezhnev and Herr Schmidt.

They were terms on which arms control talks might be resumed and in view of the tense overall situation there would seem to be little point in the Kremlin playing about with them.

Germany is keenly interested in good-neighbourly relations with countries in Eastern Europe, but Bonn cannot for a moment abandon its anxiety about the security of the country.

Its security is based exclusively on firm membership of Nato.

(Nürnberger Nachrichten, 18 March 1981)

A diplomat[ic] indispositio[n]

There is much to be said for dipl[...] illnesses. President Carstens, [...]stance, is suffering from an attack [of in]fluenza that has enabled him to [...] his state visit to Rumania.

Relations between Bonn and Bu[charest] were somewhat under the weather [...] Professor Carstens was advised [by] doctors to take it easy.

The President wanted to see [...] Germans in Transylvania as part [...] visit. The Rumanian authorities [...] hear nothing of any such idea.

The Rumanian regime co[...] emphasises its generosity towards [...]nal minorities. They include [...] 400,000 Germans and well over [...]lion Hungarians.

Official propaganda has it that [...] lack nothing that would enable the[m to] develop national traditions freely [...] without let or hindrance. But in p[ractice] it is another matter.

Bucharest has nothing to fear fro[m] ethnic Germans but is keen to p[...] them from applying for papers to [...] new life in West Germany.

Whatever the reason may have [...] the Rumanian refusal to oblige Prof[essor] Carstens led to an increasing chill [...] lations between the two countries.

There could well have been s[...] upsets. How useful a bout of 'flu ca[n be] Gesundheit, Mr President!

(Hannoversche Allgemeine, 20 March [...])

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■ **HOME AFFAIRS**

Schmidt aims to keep the domestic peace

What a contrast! At almost the same time as a tide of demonstrations [s]wept Germany, prompting Bavarian [Pr]ime Minister Franz Josef Strauss to [c]ompare the situation with the final [ph]ase of the Weimar Republic, Bonn Chancellor Helmut Schmidt at a con[gr]ess on Kant in Our Time spoke on [t]he morals, duties and responsibilities of [t]he politician.

As emotions ran high in the streets and in many government offices, the Chancellor pleaded for weighing political reason. It was almost a plea for understanding for the difficulties politicians have in reaching a decision and explaining themselves.

There have been many critical voices, both on the Left and on the Right. The Chancellor, they say, must cut through the Gordian knot and act with more determination in making decisions on nuclear energy, on defence spending and on restoring public order. What is needed, they say, is political and intellectual leadership.

The Chancellor's reaction to such demands has been unusually touchy, for a number of reasons. His Northern character is not given to heartwarming political pathos for one.

Then there is the traumatic experience of the Hitler era, in which politics usurped intellectual leadership, and years of dealing with thorny problems that don't lend themselves to simple solutions.

There is also the Chancellor's experience of the narrowness of scope for political action and the realisation that vociferous avowals frequently make statesmanship more difficult.

Much of all this is likeable or at least understandable, as for instance the fact that Schmidt refuses to become the nation's first philosophiser, that he considers it almost a revival of a subject mentality in the citizen to expect of him not only sound politics but also that he provide and create meanings and definitions.

Or take his annoyance about having sketched a pretty accurate picture of government policy, aims and scope of action in his speech during the budget debate but that it elicited no response other than the accusation of a lack of leadership.

The feud over terminology, over the question what is leadership and whether intellectual leadership is actually wanted leads nowhere.

Konrad Adenauer never laid claim to intellectual leadership yet he had an enormous influence on the intellectual climate of the country, giving rise to approval and opposition.

Willy Brandt rubbed shoulders with writers and the world of academe, much more so than Adenauer, but his effect on the nation rested on the fact that, like Adenauer, he acted as the midwife for a policy which is still considered necessary and right.

Both succeeded in elucidating their policy in the form of simple alternatives. Compared with them, Schmidt appears curiously undecided.

On rereading his remarks at the Kant congress in mid-March, we find a slew of "on the one hand, while on the other" statements: nuclear energy, though not without ifs and buts; balance of power and disarmament negotiations; open-mindedness and firmness towards the new protest wave of the young, to mention but a few.

Criticism comes easily. There is a danger that the head of government could become the verbose explainer of processes that are happening anyway; that the need for orientation guidelines remains unsatisfied; that the statesman withdraws into a no longer controllable ethic of responsibility.

Not all these points of criticism are irrelevant. Practical statesmanship is indeed not identical with cool weighing of risks. Instead, it demands certainty, mostly to a greater extent than politicians are capable of with a clear conscience.

Politicians are under considerable pressure to convey the illusion that all will be well if a certain leadership personality or a certain political direction is followed. Schmidt seems to find it increasingly difficult to spread this illusion.

It is not as if his opinion of himself were not high enough, for he certainly does not lack self-confidence, but the problems he has to deal with are not of a suitable nature. There is no policy free of charge.

The Chancellor can be criticised, and is criticised from the Left and from the Right, because, unlike Adenauer and Brandt, he is unable to reduce the issues to the necessary simple alternatives of action.

Criticism can also be formulated as a question as to political courage to the effect that the Chancellor shirks from implementing what the considers right.

There are above all two objections that can be raised against such criticism. First is the fact that Schmidt, though visible primarily through the moaning and groaning within his party rather than by his own statements, has in fact made far-reaching decisions.

Second, the tasks confronting a Chancellor consist not only of implementing his own policy at any cost but also of securing a minimum of internal peace and preserving international cooperation.

There are times, transition periods perhaps, when the main thing is not a decision without ifs and buts in favour of a specific policy that would prove leadership but when mediation, negotiation and integration are called for.

It is not the least merit of Schmidt's domestic policy to have integrated numerous and widely different groups.

There is a similar pattern in his foreign policy and his contribution towards coping with the global economic crisis as well as in his efforts to keep the two superpowers talking.

Keeping everything together and going is the phrase that comes to mind, or perhaps ability to keep the peace.

It is this very peace-keeping ability that also matters where relations with groupings that oppose nuclear energy or demonstrate on behalf of the squatters are concerned.

But this is even harder to achieve with a Second Extra-Parliamentary Opposition (APO) than with its predecessor in the late 1960s. There are several reasons why.

The demonstrators of today are both more harmless and more dangerous than the old APO. The Left dissidents at that time were incomparably more politically minded and operated with the anti-capitalist ideological vocabulary.

Dialogue with them was tedious but not impossible. It was the time when Ralf Dahrendorf and Rudi Dutschke, standing on the roof of a car, engaged in a fascinating discussion, something unthinkable today.

The new APO has no outstanding leadership personality and largely lacks a theory and the terminology to go with it. This might be one of the reasons why its demonstrations so easily turn into pointless violence, even though most of the demonstrators are more peaceful than were those in the old APO.

Much more clearly than with the old APO, it now transpires that the new



movement is a protest against technical and economic progress, an attempt to break away from modern civilisation — an alternative which, though without clear political contours, penetrates deep into the mood of wide segments of the public.

This is neither a new nor a spectacular concept; and it would not end the dispute between different creeds. But it would provide an opportunity to carry on with the dispute in a tolerable and reasonably non-violent manner. This, too, would be a political leadership achievement, and no mean one at that.

Rolf Zundel

(Die Zeit, 20 March 1981)

More at stake than housing

It is quite in order for Justice Minister Jürgen Schmude to have made a judiciary policy statement as it is in order for the Bundestag to have debated the issue of squatters and other forms of young people's protest and violence.

But mere talking about the judiciary handling of the problem misses the point. What is involved is more than just the degree of toughness in police action. In fact, if we were to revert to the tough 1967 action we would soon be faced with a major rebellion.

But then, on the other hand, a wait-and-see attitude by the police would at best provide a breathing space for political action, but it could never replace it.

The difficulty lies in the fact that the problems surrounding the dissidents urgently call for social reforms which would take years, at best, to become effective.

Moreover, it is a characteristic feature of protest movements that they have an alarm function although they rarely contribute towards a meaningful solution of problems. On the contrary. Often the protesters imitate the very attitudes they are protesting against.

So far as the squatters are concerned, there can hardly be any arguing against the scandal surrounding housing left untenanted for speculative reasons.

But *whose* housing problems are the squatters trying to solve? Who benefits from their seizing a turn-of-the-century villa while a large family remains on the endless waiting list of the housing authority?

Has anybody taken a closer look at the massive suppression effect of the Dutch *krakers* on the local housing market for low income groups and foreign workers?

The fact that laws are constantly broken through such actions is one side of the coin. Another is the fact that the social legitimacy which is always used to justify such illegal action is only too frequently imaginary.

What is really at the bottom of it is the fundamental question whether consensus on the political handling and the priorities that must govern the manner in which social needs are satisfied is still strong enough to equitably distribute the shortage.

The question is, does society still have the perserverance, patience and fairness it takes, not as virtues per se but as a means to a social end?

Those who preach such virtues to the young must ask themselves whether they have a right to do so.

By seizing property that has been put to an asocial use the squatters rudely imitate the established mechanisms of seizing the national product.

Examples of this can be seen daily on television. Those who cry loudest, who refuse to make sacrifices and who send tractors to Bonn, those who deplore environmental protection provisions are bound to be more successful than those who queue up behind a placard reading commonweal.

Distribution conflicts are unavoidable in a free society, and they become particularly acute when there is a lack of political or financial means needed to resolve them.

The challenge lies in the fact that the politicians can only expect and demand patience, tenacity and consideration from the public (and young people in particular) to the extent to which they themselves are able to offer perspectives, combining them with a credible effort on their part.

Illusory promises are useless. But equitable renouncing can also be a fascinating objective. Seen in this light, it soon becomes clear that it is far from enough to differentiate between the evil squatters and the "good German youth as a whole."

The disappointment with a self-service society and political routine frequently expresses itself in the form of apathy and lack of initiative. Those who speak of terrorism talk about a highly dangerous but peripheral phenomenon.

The liberal state truly deserves to be defended. But this must not serve as an excuse for making up political deficits by police and judicial action that drives the problems below the surface, no matter how gentle the action.

Politicians need time for their job and they must start from scratch. But they must earn the ncessary faith. They must also fight for it and, above all, they must combat the established powers of a grab-it society.

In seeking to discuss our youth (or indeed talk with it) we should know what we are letting ourselves in for.

Those concerned are quick to notice when they are being used as polemic cannon fodder in a party politics tug-of-war. They can also see when they are being taken seriously.

Besides, there comes a point when it is no longer enough to praise the paper releases by the Swiss Youth Commission without drawing any conclusions from it.

At the moment, there are no signs of a departure from established rituals, and that goes for all concerned.

Robert Leicht

(Süddeutsche Zeitung, 19 March 1981)

■ CURRENT AFFAIRS

Detente is dead, four leading pundits find in transatlantic survey

Since the Club of Rome forecast Limits to Growth it has been customary to pay more attention to projections prepared by specialists.

This is not only because politicians have their hands full coping with current affairs; it simply shows they prefer to the leave the future to the experts.

Four experts have now put their heads together to do some crystal gazing about the West's future. This does not necessarily mean the results must be four times as good.

On the contrary, intelligence can cancel itself out when multiplied, resulting in an originality shortfall.

Originality is thus not the first thought that comes to mind after the perusal of a recently published study entitled *The West's Security — New Dimensions and Tasks.*

It has been prepared by the directors of the New York-based Council on Foreign Relations, Winston Lord, the research institute of the German Society for Foreign Affairs, Bonn, Karl Kaiser, the Institut Français des Relations Internationales, Paris, Thierry de Montbrial, and the London Royal Institute of International Affairs, David Watt.

They were assisted by an advisory group including such prominent people as Christoph Bertram, Wilhelm Grewe and Robert Osgood.

The main positive points of the study are precision and matter-of-factness in the best Anglo-Saxon tradition.

The four experts, assisted by outstanding research staff, have come up with a transatlantic inventory that can only be termed unprecedented.

Far enough removed from the practical day-to-day politics of their respective countries not to be personally too involved for a realistic assessment, Kaiser, Lord, de Montbrial and Watt analyse the most disquieting aspect of current world politics, security.

Having read the booklet, the first question that comes to mind is: Are the experts optimists or pessimists?

Optimism and pessimism are in no way analytical categories, but the only conclusion one can arrive at after an initial perusal is that their assessment of the situation is bleak.

They do point out possible solutions, however, provided political practitioners heed expert advice.

The analysis is dominated by three aspects: European-American relations, American-Soviet ties and European-American attitudes towards the Third World, especially the Middle East and the Gulf.

The historic perspective that dominates this book can be summed up in one terse sentence. Détente is dead. One wonders whether the German representative in this illustrious round wholeheartedly agreed with this finding.

The discussion today can no longer revolve around the question whether détente can be revived. The actual question is: What changes has it brought about in the recent past?

The end of détente has coincided with sustained economic difficulties, which go virtually unmentioned in the publication.

The global crisis today is marked by a number of peculiarities. "The outstanding feature of today's international situation is the fact that the West is undergoing a phase of extreme tension and disunity at the very moment when it has to cope with a crisis in its relations with the East and the Third World and a sustained economic and energy crisis on a global plane."

What makes the European-American problems so dangerous is the fact that they are not always of a short-term nature.

Instead, they have arisen as a result of structural changes in European-American relations.

There can be no ignoring the fact that the influence of the Europe-oriented East Coast elite has diminished, if for no other reason than because America's foreign policy has turned its attention towards other regions in the world.

The change in the balance of power is even more important. The increasing economic development of Europe, resulting in a decline in American influence, is counterbalanced by Europe's dependence on the USA for security. This dependence has increased rather than declined.

This has led to American demands that the Europeans should make a greater defence effort and this, in turn, has led to considerable domestic tension in a Europe that has been used to security at bargain-basement prices.

The danger that segments of the West could break apart due to different assessments of the world situation has become acute as a result of the change in the military balance between the USA and the USSR.

But there is nothing new in the study's evaluation of the situation. A still existing but rapidly diminishing Western superiority in some areas of nuclear armament is balanced by Soviet superiority in most conventional areas.

The danger of such an imbalance lies not so much in the risk of an attack on Europe as in that Europe is becoming increasingly susceptible to blackmail.

The Americans speak of a "self-Finlandisation," and this is why they welcome Nato's decision to revamp its medium-range capability in Europe.

America also demands a three-percent increase in military expenditure. All this is motivated by the widespread view that the Soviet Union is increasingly prepared to take a risk.

The statements on East-West economic relations are rather conservative, but this does not mean that they should necessarily be rejected.

Here, the American influence seems to be particularly strong because the Four Wise Men were unable to agree on an assessment, just pointing to the pros and cons and leaving it to the reader to form his own conclusions on whether closer East-West ties are harmful or beneficial to the West.

The days of the good old Atlantic system are over. According to the study, a new type of security system will have to be tested, a system based on partnership and shared responsibility.

The development of such a system is, however, hampered by the specific wishes of the two parties, which leads to new tensions.

The Europeans want to continue the détente policy while the Americans want to regain their absolute leadership in world affairs, especially through the use of military power.

This illusionistic attitude is contrasted with the more realistic reshaping of foreign policy which would also imply its expansion.

The reason given for this new realism is the necessity of a common European-American Middle East involvement.

It is felt to be needed because only secure energy supplies can stop an economic crisis that would be so bad as to make the 1932 crisis a mere prelude.

In other words, foreign trade policy and military policy are lumped together.

It is here that the study comes up with surprises. Never before has there been such an outspoken plea to treat the Middle East as an issue that is as important as Europe.

"No difference should be made between an aggressive Soviet attitude in the Middle East and in Europe so far as political consequences are concerned."

This calls for military measures that would prevent the outbreak of conflicts in the Middle East from spreading to Europe.

"It is part of the logic of a policy of geographic containment of military conflicts in the Middle East that the Europeans and the Americans maintain a military presence in that region and in other areas outside Europe."

This boils down to the formulation of a post-détente doctrine. The study no longer discusses whether détente is possible or not.

It adopts the attitude that because détente is dead tension must be regionalised. In other words, not détente but tension is divisible.

The conclusion is that the Europeans and the Japanese must participate in safeguarding oil supplies. But they do not have to contribute to a rapid deployment force.

This again raises the problem of burden sharing which cannot be reduced to the formula: American soldiers, European money.

On the other hand, this must mean: "American and European personnel and money and American recommendations."

The four experts reject American complaints that Europe is leaving America in the lurch with its global burdens.

They make a number of suggestions such as a qualitative improvement of American military personnel, more discussion on the challenges of the 1980s in which top politicians are to take part, the MBFR talks on mutual troop reductions must be governed by "real military capabilities" rather than the number of troops, withdrawal from the CSCE process should the USSR invade Poland and finally, reduction of exports to the USSR.

The experts would be no experts if they did not call for an increase in expert committees and closer consultation.

Of all the proposals, the one that calls for a permanent summit of seven states would include security issues is the least plausible.

Anybody who remembers the discrepancies between the resolutions of summits since 1975 and the subsequent consequences will see this as a desperate attempt to overcome objective differences by personal charm.

For the French and the Americans, whose Presidents have sweeping foreign policy authority, such an idea may have an attraction.

But for other countries, among them the Federal Republic of Germany, it would amount to no more than a foreign policy arabesque.

What would be more effective is the formation of small groups of key Western states that are interested in a particular region and are prepared to become involved there.

Since a central group includes the major European states and the USA this would have the advantage of engendering more understanding for the European line of argument.

The 53-page study has been praised by some as the political book of the year. But this it is not for two reasons:

1. The authors had to stick to a very brittle type of reality while at the same time exerting influence on politics. This imposes limits on the imagination.


2. They were only able to deal with one segment of the wide range of challenges. Domestic policy realities are mentioned in passing in a few places, as are the difficulties of realising some of the ideas.

Even the non-military aspect of security is mentioned here and there. But in essence, the booklet is a study of military policy, leaving the social and development policy background [illegible] pale.

The book's merit lies elsewhere. It has at last provided a discussion platform that can be expanded. It has also overcome national egotisms and shown that an analytical approach to politics not only bares difficulties but can also indicate new avenues.

Paul Noack

(Deutsches Allgemeines Sonntagsblatt, 15 March 1981)



■ MEDIA

Deutsche Welle and *Deutschlandfunk*, world radio's voices of Germany

We were full of hatred when we left Germany in 1937. But *Deutsche Welle* (The Voice of Germany) has helped us to forget. We've been listening to its broadcasts for the past 25 years. May it stay on the air for a long, long time.

This quote from a letter by Freddy and Sonia Howard of Herts., England, is one of several hundred thousand the *Welle*, as its staffers call it, receives every year.

Last year alone the Cologne-based short-wave station, which broadcasts in 34 languages, received 404,058 letters (1979: 381,927).

In terms of listeners' mail the *Welle* thus ranks before the BBC. And the same goes for popularity, as established last year by the International Short-Wave Club.

In its survey the *Welle* occupied first place ahead of BBC, Radio Netherlands and the Voice of America.

The Russian-language programme alone, an American survey shows, has some 10 million weekly listeners.

Russian writer Lev Kopelev, who has been stripped of his citizenship and now lives in Cologne, has been receiving telephone calls from all parts of the Soviet Union since *Deutsche Welle* broadcast an interview with him a couple of weeks ago.

Here, it must be taken into account that the Soviets have been jamming the *Welle's* Russian-language programme since the Polish troubles started in August 1980.

German-language mail from more than 150 countries and territories amounted to 54,000 items last year, and thus represented the lion's share of mail.

Though 16,000 of these letters came from West Germany, more than from any other one place in the world, it was closely followed by Namibia, formerly German South-West Africa, Brazil, Argentina and South Africa. Some 1,200 German-speaking listeners wrote from Israel last year.

Though the bulk of the mail had to do with the German-language programme and contained wishes, suggestions, expressions of gratitude, praise and, of course, criticism, the *Welle* is increasingly becoming a sort of information exchange for questions on Germany.

They range from listeners wanting to know about German companies that can supply sisal processing machinery and suggestions for more effective development aid to German-descent Americans who want information on their forebears in the Black Forest.

Frequently, listeners write to ask to have letters forwarded to German politicians. Many write in English (last year 53,000). The most prolific letter-writers among the English language correspondents are the Indians (22,278) and Ugandans (7,099).

Some 25,000 listeners wrote in French last year, but they were by far outstripped by African languages. 42,000 wrote in Hausa and an equal number in Swahili.

But letters written in African languages did by no means come from Africa only. Many were mailed in Greece, Britain, Rumania and the USA.

The Arabic mail (12,564 items) also did not only come from Arabic-speaking countries but from France, Austria, Sweden, etc.

The listeners' mail department handles some 8,000 letters a week and the trend is rising.

Deutsche Welle tries to be helpful by maintaining P.O. boxes in 24 developing countries so that the listeners can write at local postage rates rather than paying the high overseas rate.

Of course, much mail also means lots of criticism. But at least Asian complaints about poor reception can now be soothed by pointing to the fact that a relay station in Sri Lanka is soon to become operative.

Unfortunately, a tight budget makes it hard to meet demands for the inclusion of additional languages.

What really flabbergasted the listeners' mail department was a listener who wanted to know why German politicians that are interviewed by the *Welle* speak such poor German.

Germany's most modern broadcasting stations on the southern periphery of Cologne house 2,400 staffers and stand up to 138 metres high.

The stations are *Deutsche Welle* and *Deutschlandfunk*, which have finally found a permanent home after having operated from provisional premises for years.

Deutsche Welle maintained its studios and offices in various office buildings scattered throughout the city, and *Deutschlandfunk* began operations in early 1962 in a large old villa in the suburb of Marienburg.

What were formerly living rooms, bedrooms, pantries, etc. were turned into studios, with loosely laid cables all along the walls.

The furnishings were primitive but sound insulation was so outstanding that the Polish Embassy, which later moved into the building, asked that it be left.

The new high-rise buildings lack such welcome features as windows facing a somewhat overgrown garden with old trees.

But technically the new premises are outstanding. The acoustics are of the very first order, the sound insulation is tops and, of course, the whole complex is air-conditioned.

The huge high-rise buildings, visible from afar, give a dark and lifeless impression even in glaring sunlight.

Deutschlandfunk broadcasts in German 24 hours a day and has evening broadcasts in 14 European languages. Its listeners include not only people in both Germanies and the rest of Europe but also people all over the Continent who are interested in a comprehensive picture of Germany.

Deutsche Welle, which is little known in Germany, fulfills the same function but broadcasts on short wave and can be heard world-wide. Its broadcasts are in German and 33 foreign languages, including Sanskrit, and it broadcasts 90 hours a day.

It has transmitters in Jülich (half-way between Cologne and Aachen), in Bavaria, in Rwanda, Portugal and on two Caribbean islands.

The programmes that start with the call sign based on *Es sucht der Bruder seine Brüder* are also transmitted via the Symphonie Franco-German communications satellite.

The *Deutsche Welle* subsidiary Transtel has for some years been making foreign language films informing about West German politics, economics and cultural affairs.

In addition, there is an installation through which TV pictures can be converted from video tapes to 16mm film.

More than 1,000 copies a month are made for subsequent broadcasting by numerous foreign stations.

Central and South American stations are interested primarily in information, education, technology, science, art and literature plus sports and music.

African stations prefer topical German subjects, children's programmes and entertainment. Asian viewers usually opt for a mixed bag.

The Bonn government provided the 14-acre site for the new buildings. When the foundation stone was laid in the spring of 1974 everybody praised the excellent location along the planned city highway, but the highway failed to materialise.

The two radio stations share a library, archives, the electronic data processing installation, workshops, the air conditioning plant and the emergency generator.

The various editorial offices all have their own studios on the same floor, while the 85-metre studio tower of *Deutsche Welle* houses 46 dust-free studios for radio plays, two of them with a floor area of 75 square metres each — something radio producers could only dream of before.

The TV section also contains the dubbing studios and many technical innovations, among them a converter for all TV systems to enable Transtel to provide its programmes to suit every country.

Artificial sound effects have virtually been done away with because the studios are equipped with wooden, stone and steel stairs, taps, doors and windows with various types of latches, paths of sand, tile and gravel plus numerous other such aids to "noises off."

Short-wave listeners will always be first to learn what's new in the world. Cologne radio experts recommend the BBC World Service at dawn, the Voice of America in the early morning hours plus Radio Australia and, of course, *Deutsche Welle* at any time of day or night.

So before leaving home to go to work, listeners can already get the first news from America where it is just past midnight, from Australia where it is early afternoon and, of course, from Europe.

Incidentally, the foundation stone contains several documents, among them postage stamps from 156 countries, something to give future archaeologists a thing or two to puzzle over.

(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung für Deutschland, 18 March 1981)

Klaus Schütz director-general at *Deutsche Welle*

The new director-general of *Deutsche Welle*, Klaus Schütz (SPD), outgoing ambassador to Israel and formerly mayor of West Berlin, told *Die Welt* recently that the short-wave station would "depict all aspects of Germany as it has always done."

Deutsche Welle's function, he said, is to put across the German view on important issues. The Bonn government might be the central authority but the German view could not be understood to be one-sidedly the government view.

The top 34 staffers guarantee that *Deutsche Welle* will do justice to this function. "I see no need for a 'revolution'," Herr Schütz told the newspaper.

He disagreed with the view that party-political influence on *Deutsche Welle* has become more pronounced with his appointment:


"I'm a Social Democrat, but so far as my new office is concerned I don't consider myself the representative of any one political party."

He stressed that *Deutsche Welle* would not become a government station under his directorship:

"I was never a journalist and my appointment to the post won't make me one. But I'll see to it that the journalists can work as freely as possible."

Schütz, who is expected to assume his post in summer, hopes that the station will benefit from his experience in international cooperation as a state secretary in the Bonn Foreign Ministry under Willy Brandt and as ambassador to Israel.

The station, he said, would devote more attention to North-South problems but it would not become a station specialised in developing countries.


Klaus Schütz
(Photo: Marianne von der Lancken)

Like his late predecessor Conrad Ahlers (SPD), Klaus Schütz was elected by the Radio Council on second ballot.

He said he was certain that Bonn would press for the implementation of those parts of the CSCE agreement which concern overseas broadcasting.

But the overall political situation also has a bearing on the effectiveness of *Deutsche Welle*. Said he: "I hope we won't be faced with new pressure."

Addressing himself to the East Bloc, he said: "Anybody who wants information on the Federal Republic of Germany will do well to tune in to *Deutsche Welle* and will also be well advised not to jam its broadcasts."

Gernot Facius

(Die Welt, 18 March 1981)

■ BUSINESS

Fierce competition on Eurobond market

Frankfurter Allgemeine

There is a bleak mood on the Euromarket. Risks are growing, competition is getting tougher and banks are haring to calculate ever more keenly.

Dilemmas are the order of the day. Take the credit negotiations with Poland. Polish debts have swelled to more than $23bn, and the Poles have admitted at conferences in London and Paris that they are unable to pay. What is more they need further Western assistance.

If it were to stay on schedule, Warsaw would have to repay $10.9bn this year. Its inability to do so leaves the Eurobanks with only two possibilities: They can reschedule the loans and provide new credits or they can put Poland on the spot.

There are, however, not only political considerations that speak against the latter action but also down-to-earth commercial exigencies.

If Poland were unable to make repayments on due date, the Eurobanks concerned would have to provide the necessary reserves in their balance sheets, and the consequences would be rather unpleasant.

As a way out of the dilemma they recommend that their national governments once more jump into the breach with guarantees. But this would mean burdening the taxpayers of the creditor countries with the Polish credit risk.

Another case in point is the negotiations about the vaunted DM10bn credit for the natural gas in return for pipelines deal between Germany and Russia.

The interest rates offered by the Soviet Union are unrealistic but negotiations linger on, though they are becoming increasingly more tedious.

One of the reasons for the continued talks is Germany's interest in energy supplies. But international competition alo plays a role.

The Japanese government for one has given its banks operating on the Euromarket the green light for $3bn credit for the same project.

A third example is the GDR, which is now canvassing the Euromarket with Soviet backing.

The GDR's net debt has risen to $6bn. A credit consortium headed by the Paris-based Crédit Lyonnais has granted East Berlin's Foreign Trade Bank a new five-year roll-over credit of $250m a ridiculously low interest rate of 5/8th per cent above the London interbank offered rate.

What has prompted the Eurobanks to be so generous towards the East Bloc? Political considerations play a role; so do national interests in promoting exports to the Communist bloc.

Another important element is the money glut on the Euromarket, which has gained the upper hand over reticence. New billions from the Opec countries keep flooding the market month after month.

Granted, once in a while the Opec countries buy blocks of shares, real estate in Paris or precious metals and they also increasingly give direct credits to development banks.

But this is only a fraction of Opec surpluses which will again reach at least $80bn this year, and the bulk of this money will continue to go to the major banks.

The Opec countries pin their faith on the fact that these banks are not seriously in jeopardy because no industrial nation will risk cracks in its banking system.

Seen in this light, it is all quite simple. The Opec countries pump money into the Euromarket, leaving it to the banks to worry about recycling petrodollars by channeling then back into the world economy, on the banks' account and at their risk, of course.

The number of countries still considered reasonably creditworthy this spring has declined still further. There are whole groups of countries in Africa, Latin America and Asia which, in the bankers' view, are barely creditworthy any longer.

But banks have learned from experience. The risk element is analysed more closely and they are now prepared to say no in certain cases.

And when new credit is extended to problem countries, this is usually done to maintain their ability to service interest at least. This again shows the cleft stick in which the banks find themselves.

As a result, banks prefer to lend their money to rich industrial countries which now depend on international credit to balance their current accounts (among them the Federal Republic of Germany).

But here other problems arise. Lending money to powerful industrial countries is not always a profitable deal.

Competition on the money market is fierce and banks are lucky if they can command a margin of 3/8th of a percentage point, a margin hardly in keeping with the overall risks Eurobanks run.

The recent earthquake credit to Italy is a typical example. Bankers Trust, New York, promised to arrange a $2bn credit on preferential terms, so to speak as a social gesture to alleviate misery.

But the Eurobanks to whom Bankers Trust went for money were reluctant to go along and Bankers Trust had to halve its commitment.

A means by which the Eurobanks could get out of the current dilemma and retain the high influx of petrodollars was presented last year in New Orleans by Dr Wilfried Guth of Deutsche Bank and reiterated in a lecture at St Gallen University, Switzerland.

His idea is to harness the IMF, the World Bank and other development banks, which would be entrusted with recycling the petrodollars.

Ideally, says Guth, the Opec countries should take a risk and lend their money directly to the developing countries. But they are reluctant to do so, for obvious reasons.


The second-best solution would be a recycling system in which the banks would only act as brokers or a sort of clearing house for petrodollars. They would lend this money to international institutions.

The IMF and the World Bank would be backed by member-nations, in other words, essentially by the taxpayers of Western industrial nations.

All these are just spotlights beamed on a complex situation. They show the extent to which the oil crisis has affected the world. They also give rise to disquieting vistas of the future.

Heinz Brestel

(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung für Deutschland, 18 March 1981)



Grain embargo was a flop

The European Community's grain embargo against the Soviet Union in response to the invasion of Afghanistan has remained ineffectual.

A classified study by the EEC Commission shows that in 1980 the European Community exported more grain, butter and other agricultural products to the USSR than ever before.

Following the January 1980 Washington boycott decision the Community undertook not to fill the gap created by the American embargo.

Yet the EEC in the first half of 1980 shipped more than 842,000 tons of grain to the USSR, quadrupling its normal shipments.

In addition, the Soviet Union during this period received 93,000 tons of be[illegible] 31,000 tons of poultry and 380,000 tons of sugar from EEC stocks.

Butter exports were discontinued after massive protests from Germany and Britain. But this happened after the Russians had already received 130,000 tons.

The quotas to be supplied under the boycott provisions were 70,000 tons of butter and between 200,000 and 400,000 tons of grain a year.

The final figures for 1980, which are still under wraps but have leaked out to some extent, substantiate the ineffectiveness of the embargo.

All that has been learned so far is that the Soviet Union managed to cover most of its agricultural requirements from EEC supplies after the USA discontinued its shipments.

France, which has been demanding for months that the embargo be lifted, can now point to the study, which shows that the boycott was ignored anyway.

France's farmers, who had a bumper crop in 1980, are pressing for exports to the USSR where the 1980 harvest, according to information from America, amounted to only 179 million tons and was thus 60 million tons short of target.

Canada lifted its embargo as far back as 29 November 1980 and promised to supply Moscow with 5 million tons of grain in 1981.

US President Reagan promised in his election campaign that he would lift the embargo immediately after his inauguration to safeguard farmers' interests.

He has since changed his mind and will continue the embargo for the time being.

dpa

(Allgemeine Zeitung, 13 March 1981)

Exports face Japanese challenge

A cursory glance at the economic data of the world's major exporting nations makes it hard to understand why there is so much talk of a Japanese export offensive.

Recent figures released by the Institute for the German Economy show that the United States accounts for 10.9 per cent of the world's exports, with Germany ranking a close second with its 10.5 per cent. Japan lags far behind with its 6.3 per cent.

But this is deceptive. While German business only just managed to stand its ground in the past few years, and even that only because Britain and America declined in the export sector, the Japanese have been gaining ground continuously.

What worries the Germans particularly is the fact that the Japanese are concentrating on exactly that type of goods with which Germany has been particularly successful on foreign markets; high-calibre capital and consumer goods.

First the Japanese overtook Germany in precision engineering and optical instruments, then they followed this up in the consumer electronics sector.

Right now the automobile and electrical industries in Germany are fighting a rearguard action.

Even though mechanical engineering still manages to hold on to its lead world-wide, here, too, Japan is catching up.

The Japanese operate along the same lines that accounted for Germany's economic success after World War II. Highly skilled labour uses the most modern of technology and production methods to make goods that are exactly what the market wants.

German industry will have to step up its research and development sector if it is to hold its position as one of the world's major exporters.

Rainer Diermann

(Nordwest Zeitung, 10 March 1981)

TRADE

Russians stall on terms of natural gas deal

...ergy talks between Bonn and Moscow are not going as smoothly as ... should. Yet it is safe to assume that ... are interested in the deals involved, ... the DMbn natural gas in return for ... contract.

... it is here in particular that ... have arisen and, as usual, they ... to do with details.

A spokesman for one of the banks in ... consortium of 20 which is to pro... the DM1bn credit recently said that ... tug-of-war over interest rates had ... pletely bogged down.

... of the banks have refused to ac... the 9.75 per cent provisionally ... on.

The Russians, annoyed anyway be... talks are progressing so slowly, ... now definitely said that they will ... discuss interest rates any longer.

According to Moscow, it is the German bankers who have put the spanner ... the works. But in another trouble ... of Soviet-German energy relations ... blame lies squarely with Moscow.

The Soviet Union, it was learned re... wants to reduce crude oil ship... to Western Europe by 20 to 25 ... cent. The reason given is technical ... culties.

This information was first passed on ... the Italian embassy by the Soviet ... eign Trade Ministry.

...st *year Russia* supplied Italy with ... million tons of Russian crude at ... prices. This year, shipments will ... back to just under four million tons, which is more of a blow for Italy than it would have been for West Germany which last year bought 3.5 million tons of Soviet crude, accounting for a mere three per cent of total oil imports.

As a result, Bonn is not particularly alarmed by the news from Moscow because, as an oil industry spokesman puts it: "Russian oil is incredibly expensive and not of the best quality."

It is possible that the alleged "technical difficulties" are meant to cover up for the fact that Soviet oil exploration has fallen short of target.

It is a well-known fact that the Russians are as troubled by oil shortages as is the West.

Granted, they have enormous reserves, but they are in regions that are inaccessible and the technical and climatic difficulties there are incomparably greater than in the Arabian desert.

In any event, oil production is far short of target. According to the *Financial Times*, the 1980 production target was 640 million tons but only 603 million tons were actually produced.

Output between 1980 and 1985 will rise by only one per cent a year, which is totally inadequate to slake the growing oil thirst of Soviet industry even if industrial growth also falls far short of expectations.

Moreover, the Kremlin also has problems with its East Bloc trading partners, who last year bought 80 million tons of Soviet crude at prices way below those charged by Opec.

Moscow now charges Comecon members a composite price based on the per-barrel price of the past five years. This means that the steep prices charged by Opec between 1978 and 1980 have only partially been passed on to East Bloc buyers of Russian oil.

Poland clearly demonstrates that the Russians are rather tight-fisted with their oil even when it comes to their friends.

Last year, Poland received just under 16 million tons of crude from its big brother but it needed 19 million tons. As a result, Warsaw had to make up the difference by buying three million tons at world market prices.

It is unknown whether the Kremlin has now called on its Comecon partners to tighten their energy belts, but Western buyers of Soviet crude will certainly feel the pinch of Russia's technical problems.

There are, however, subtle differences. Finland, for instance, will get preferential treatment and will be better off than the Italians.

The French will also be treated more generously than, say, the Federal Republic of Germany because the Kremlin is interested in improving its economic and political ties with Paris.

This might apply to Bonn as well, but here the protracted natural gas talks have had their effect. Perhaps Moscow would like to hint to Bonn how interested it is in the DM10bn natural gas deal.

Bonn is bound to take note of the hint and conclude that technical difficulties are always a possibility where the Soviet Union is concerned.

Helmut Roesler

(Rheinischer Merkur/Christ und Welt, 20 March 1981)

Growing pressure on Bundesbank to lift credit squeeze

Anxiety over the Bundesbank's tight money policy is spreading. The ...burg Chamber of Trade, for instance, has called on the central bank to ... its foot off the brakes immediately.

Social Democrat MPs in Bonn had ... economic affairs spokesman, Wolf... Roth, remind the Bundesbank that ... "a domestic economy factor of the ... water and that its interest rate poli... can only by termed a horror trip."

Meanwhile, the Social Democrats in ... government are having horror visions as ... They fear that the high interest ... will give the sagging economy the ... de grace.

... the looming decline materialises ... planning must collapse like a ... of cards.

...ing unemployment will necessitate ...tional funds for the Federal Labour ... (which pays unemployment be...) and the resultant falling social ... contributions will force Bonn to ... into its pocket to help finance pen...

... what good is it to dig into an ... pocket?

Since high interest rates preclude an ... economic upswing that would boost tax ... the state will be in even more ... need for money and will have to ... even more.

Additional credit demands by the ... will hike interest rates still further. ... vicious circle.

Meanwhile, the Bundesbank, as its president made quite clear at a ... colloquium with bankers, will ... to its tight money policy and yield ... neither begging nor verbal abuse.

The domestic economy is only one of ... Frankfurt central bankers' worries.

They also have to do something about the growing current account deficit.

As happened 30 years ago, more foreign exchange has been leaving the country in the past two years than has been coming in. But unlike then, currency restrictions are now out of the question.

So here we are, caught in a cleft stick. Our oil bill is rising and so is the foreign exchange amount we have to pay to the Opec countries.

But the sheikhs no longer use this money to buy mammoth projects from us such as harbours, roads, housing and factories. They are troubled by a lack of skilled labour which money alone cannot buy.

So what can we do to bring back the petrodollars? The Bundesbank's idea is to offer the sheikhs a stable deutschemark and attractive interest rates and so manage to keep the balance of payments deficit within tolerable limits.

The trouble is that this drives the economy into a nosedive. On the face of it, the situation seems hopeless. But is it really?

Perhaps there could be a way out of the industrial countries would stop thinking only of themselves.

They could join forces and prompt the Opec countries to invest their money where it will do the most good for humanity as a whole, in the developing nations and above all the poorest of the poor.

This would enable the Third World countries to get their economies going again and buy from the industrial countries, for the good of all.

But it is most unlikely that the industrial countries, which themselves are providing very little in development aid, can induce the Opec nations to do this.

The sheikhs are businessmen and invest their money where it is safe and earns good interest.

So what about if the industrial countries stopped giving good advice and paid the oil producers the interest on loans granted to the poorest of the poor and if they guaranteed repayment of the principal?

This would be costly and would call for an increase of the development aid budgets. But since the industrial countries are short of money to do so they would have to cut back on their defence budgets.

However, they evidently consider it easier to sell military hardware to the Opec countries and so recycle some of the oil money.

This is one way of reducing the current account deficit. But who is to guarantee that these arms will not be used to wage war, as is happening now between Iran and Iraq, and so stop the oil flow altogether?

Jürgen Duenbostel

(Deutsches Allgemeines Sonntagsblatt, 22 March 1981)

Exports to East Bloc

It has been customary for the past few years to speak of German exports to the East Bloc as stagnating at a high level.

This is supposed to have a positive ring and convey the idea that German shipments to the East have not collapsed as a result of the general political situation.

But clichés should always make you think. The fact is that German exports to the Comecon countries have risen by a mere 11.4 per cent nominally since 1975.

In other words, the growth rate has fallen far short of price increases, which boils down to a decline in real terms. Yet German imports from the East Bloc have more than doubled.

After the steep rise in imports from the West in the first half of the 1970s, this change did not come as a surprise. It was primarily due to detente and an economic change of course in the East Bloc.

Imported technology was to help the East catch up economically. Most East Bloc countries were therefore prepared to borrow heavily from the West, unlike in the 1960s.

But indebtedness reached such proportions as to start worrying the East Bloc. As a result, there was another change of course in the mid-1970s.

Now exports to the West were to be boosted and imports curbed in order to achieve a balance of trade. Most countries were successful, though to varying degrees.

In 1975, Germany's balance of trade with the East showed a surplus of DM8.8bn; by last year this had shrunk to DM2bn.

But indebtedness to the West was not the only reason for the East Bloc's curbs on imports. They were also due to the realisation that a modern plant can only operate as efficiently as in the West if there is the skilled labout to run it, if a standard of quality is maintained and if there are adequate transport routes and energy supplies.

In many cases these prerequisites did not exist. As a result, the simple expedient of paying for a plant from the export proceeds of the goods produced by it did not work.

This fallacy is one of the main reasons for Poland's economic straits and for the cancellation of mammoth Chinese orders from the West.

The development of the infrastructure necessary for such major projects by far exceeds the capabilities of these countries.


In fact, the days of mammoth projects, with few exceptions, are over so far as trade with the East is concerned.

Not only China but most East Bloc countries are now concentrating on modernising existing industries. In addition, they want to put their neglected agriculture into order and to boost the consumer goods industry.

This does not mean that they will forgo Western technology. On the contrary, modernisation also calls for it. But the range of goods supplied to the East will change and sales of large-scale plant will go down still further.

Trade with the Soviet Union could well take a somewhat different course

Continued on page 9



COMMODITIES



Reagan administration muscles in on UN Law of the Sea Conference

The UN Conference of the Law of the Sea went into its tenth session in New York on 9 March. It has met regularly since 1973.

Its brief is to review the law of the sea as a whole and to prepare a draft convention on all aspects of the subject.

Given the comprehensive and manifold nature of issues on the conference agenda and the number of countries and interests represented, it is hardly surprising the conference has proved such a blockbuster.

Yet since August 1980 a preliminary convention draft dealing with most of the problems that have arisen has been under consideration.

The tenth session is intended to settle the few outstanding issues, admittedly important ones, by 24 April 1981 so the convention can be signed without further ado in Caracas this autumn.

Several conference timetables have gone by the board in the past but the current plan has so far been generally rated realistic.

The tenth session is intended to concentrate on three main groups of issues.

The first is whether and, if so, to what extent international organisations are to be entitled to sign the convention. This point is of great importance to the European Community.


A related issue is what national liberation movements are to be entitled to membership by the terms of the convention, an issue sure to prove controversial.

The second concerns the body that is to supervise sea-bed and ocean-floor mining until such time as the convention comes into force. The powers of this body, the preparatory commission, or prepcom, are to extend far beyond mere technicalities.

It will, in the final analysis, pave the way in which the Sea-Bed Authority, or Enterprise, is to supervise exploitation of the sea-bed and ocean floor.

Prepcom procedural rules will, for instance, apply to the Enterprise for as long as the countries concerned have not agreed to others.

Enterprise procedures will be of crucial importance in implementing specific regulations.



The third is safeguards for the extremely heavy investment made by mining companies before the convention comes into force.

Exploration of the sea and construction of pilot plant are unlikely to go ahead for as long as companies are not assured of being able to benefit from this spadework later.

Investors from countries that are signatories to the convention should enjoy priority.

When others apply for the right to work in an area there must be no question of the rights of the company that originally explored the area being in any way prejudiced.

The developing countries have yet to accept such proposals.

These issues alone would have been problems enough for the tenth session, but the conference now unexpectedly faces even tougher issues.

The Reagan administration has announced that it does not feel bound by the results achieved at the previous nine sessions, arrived at by consensus as they were.

The draft as it stands was discussed item by item until no delegation expressly objected to the wording. By this token the the US government had not objected to the results achieved.

The State Department now says the debate will no longer be able to be concluded at the end of the tenth session. Washington, it says, is still in the process of reviewing the serious problems that have arisen in the course of the conference and its results so far.

America will not be objecting to coastal states' rights being substantially extended in coastal waters. As a coastal state it stands to benefit from this particular change.

Exploitation of the sea-bed is another matter, however. It will be the first time an international organisation has ever mined, processed and marketed raw materials in this context.

Private companies are required by the terms of the current negotiating text to sell to the Enterprise at fair and reasonable prices their technology and that of their suppliers.

A compulsory transfer of private property is thus envisaged, which is a new departure in the law of property as an aspect of international affairs.

In terms of free trade this mandatory transfer of know-how may arguably be warranted inasmuch as the Authority is the custodian of the riches of the sea as a common heritage of mankind.

The same cannot be said of the further obligation envisaged, that of turning over the details to competing companies from other countries.

The Reagan administration appears to be reserving the right to reject this dirigist and protectionist system either entirely or in part as unacceptable.

The Americans may have in mind the repercussions of the system for the law of the sea.

They may also have in mind its consequences for the future shape of international economic ties as a whole.

After the complex and protracted negotiations that led to the results as they stand, this turning point in US views will not be taken kindly by the majority of delegations at the conference.

Yet the Americans may, for two reasons, succeed in bringing about changes even at this late stage in the proceedings.

First, the increase in coastal states' powers as envisaged in the convention is already a certainty. The results accomplished by the conference in this respect have gained international acceptance to a large extent and been put into practice.

So the US position is far from unfavourable on this point.

Second, for both power-political and geographical reasons it is doubtful whether a new law of the sea convention that failed to meet with US approval could attain much practical significance.

In past negotiations the United States has been concerned primarily with the military consequences of a new convention, especially its provisions for straits.

Once satisfactory arrangements had been made on this point the Carter administration was evidently prepared to accept sea-bed solutions that could hardly be seen as in keeping with market forces.

The Reagan administration was so strongly in favour of allowing market forces to take their course that this viewpoint was bound to be called into question.

Given the technology-orientated, commodity-dependent economy of the Federal Republic of Germany, the importance of any change in the convention draft along such lines is self-evident.

Dr Rudolf Dolzer

(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung für Deutschland, 10 March 1981)

East Bloc

Continued from page 7

because of its current-account position which has improved due to price increases for primary energy.

But there are limits here too, even though German shipments to the Soviet Union rose by close to 20 per cent in 1980. This growth rate was largely due to purchases in connection with the Olympic Games.

This year's trade with the East Bloc will be marked by the East's efforts to improve its current account position.

Willingness to borrow has also been reduced by high interest rate levels. So far as German imports from the East are concerned, they have slowed down due to economic stagnation.

To make matters worse, competition always becomes fiercer in a recession. As a result, we should be grateful for small mercies and be satisfied with stagnation at a high level. *Hans-Jürgen Mahnke*

(Die Welt, 7 March 1981)

Bonn joins select band of Antarctic powers

Since the beginning of this month Bonn has shared responsibility for the Antarctic which, with a surface area of roughly 13 million square kilometres, is nearly half as large again as the United States.

In Buenos Aires the Federal Republic of Germany became the 14th member of the select body of consultative states by the terms of the International Antarctic Treaty.

The foremost objective of this agreement is to ensure the integrity of the sub-continent and its exclusively peaceful exploitation.

The consultative body, consisting of the 12 initial signatories of the 1959 treaty and Poland, will largely decide what happens in and to the Antarctic.

The South Pole continent may be covered almost entirely in ice but it has long ceased to be considered a mere waste land hostile to life as we know it.

It has substantial natural resources such as oil, coal, iron, copper and even uranium.

Krill, a tiny shrimp that mills around in Antarctic waters, could one day prove a major supplier of protein and a great help in solving mankind's food problems.

Bonn is now one of the select band of countries bearing the aims and objectives of the Antarctic Treaty.

It was accepted as a member of this inner circle fairly fast and unanimously at the third special consultative conference in Buenos Aires, Bonn government sources noted.

Fears that the East Bloc might try to ensure similar status for the GDR, which is merely an ordinary member of the treaty organisation, proved unfounded.

Membership of the consultative group was granted in acknowledgement of Antarctic research by West German scientists and the Bonn government's Antarctic research programme.


They were judged to testify to a lasting interest in the Antarctic, especially the last-minute establishment of the first German year-round base camp.

Virtually at the last minute the site of the camp had to be shifted to the Jelbart ice shelf in Atka Bay. Construction was greatly hampered by snow and storms.

The original site on the Filchner ice shelf had to be abandoned after unusually thick ice in the Weddell Sea this year stopped the German supply ships from getting through.

Bonn has so far invested roughly DM260m in the Antarctic research programme. Fundamental German research interests were at stake, former Bonn Research Minister Volker Hauff once said.

As a country traditionally associated with both the arts and the sciences Germany was duty-bound, he felt, to contribute towards research into a continent that was still largely marked in white on the map.



But issues of more immediate political importance are likely to arise before long. They will include exploration and exploitation of natural resources beneath the eternal ice.

This is an issue on which the consultative committee has the last word. A convention to protect the living riches of the Antarctic's waters has already been drafted; a further convention on mineral resources is to follow.

More than 100 Antarctic recommendations have so far been made by this inner circle of countries.

They have dealt with specially protected areas, animal catches, environmental protection and Antarctic tourism, which has increased fast and furiously.

The Soviet Union in particular is said to be keen on environmental considerations, arguably with ulterior motives. Russia is obviously anxious to stall Western prospecting and exploitation of the continent's natural resources until such time as it can compete with Western technology. *Hartmut-J. Keppner/dpa*

(Der Tagesspiegel, 7 March 1981)

■ THE ARTS

Prussia's architect

Karl Friedrich Schinkel, who was born 200 years ago in Neuruppin, near Berlin, was impressed at an early age by the monumental pathos of Ancient Greek and Roman architecture.

He toured Italy, as befitted a Romantic enthusiast, and in Rome was noted as a promising youngster by Wilhelm von Humboldt, the Prussian ambassador.

During the lean years of the Napoleonic occupation he earned a living for himself and his family as a painter of idealistic landscapes and imitation mediaeval city scenes.

He astounded his contemporaries with theatrically painted (one might almost say stage) versions of historic events.

He introduced a new style in stage set design, simplifying it, and designed all manner of buildings, furniture and the like.

Castles were his favourite, but he also designed buildings to order, also bridges, chairs, tables, desks, the Iron Cross and Arkona lighthouse on the Baltic island of Rügen.

He devoted years to the upkeep and



Karl Friedrich Schinkel
(Photo: Historia)

completion of Cologne cathedral and rebuilt Stolzenfels castle, near Koblenz, for the Crown Prince once the Rhineland had been restored to Prussia.

In 1838 he was appointed architect-general of Prussia. By that time he was incurably ill but his reputation in Germany was unsurpassed. The Schinkel style was in universal demand.


Schinkel was a clergyman's son who showed musical talent and an interest in the theatre at an early age. But he was always determined to be an architect.

His mother moved to Berlin, where he made the acquaintance of Friedrich Gilly, whose 1797 competition model of a monument to Frederick the Great both delighted Schinkel and decided him on his style for life.

The monument was to be a kind of new Acropolis, a monumental recreation of the Ancient world but simplified in design along the lines of French revolutionary architecture.

Schinkel often made Gothic and at times even Oriental departures, but basically he remained true to a strict cubic form, nobly simplified and based on the Ancient Greek style.

He always bore in mind the purpose of the building he was to design but his



The Prussian royal palace in Berlin as it looked in about 1840
(Photo: Historia)

Grecian style laid the groundwork of his fame and was imitated by his successors, especially in Berlin, of course.

He toured Italy in 1803, looking at his first Gothic cathedrals in Prague and Vienna en route. Venice he termed Saracen, while in Rome he came to Humboldt's attention, which was later to gain him access to high society in Berlin.

This point is worth noting, since careers are not like pennies from heaven.

In Italy he was impressed not only by Ancient Roman but also by Renaissance architecture. He returned to Berlin via Paris in 1805.

There he made friends with artists sharing similar views, such as Brentano, Tieck, Armin and Grimm. Rauch, the sculptor, was to work alongside Schinkel for decades. He was a lifelong friend of Beuth, a leading tradesman of the age.

He embarked on a painting career for lack of opportunity as an architect. Prussia offered little in the way of work in his chosen career before 1815.

He was a dilettante at the easel, but in the best sense of the term, drawing and sketching about 3,000 Mediterranean views, Scandinavian landscapes and mediaeval scenes.

He also painted about 60 oil paintings, enormous panoramas. His last major painting dated 1825, at the height of phil-Hellenism, was entitled A View of Greece in Flower.

"Everyone who has seen this landscape is amazed," wrote Bettina von Arnim, "and I shouldn't be at all surprised if it were to earn him more fame than his buildings."

But for once she was wrong. His work as an architect is rated much more highly than his heroic landscapes with their marble buildings and wide-ranging perspectives.

It has also outlived his countless sets for the Berlin *Schauspielhaus*, designed between 1816 and 1838 and much admired at the time.

His first public building, the *Neue Wache* in Berlin, built between [illegible] and 1818, is probably his most popu[illegible]

It is a bastion with a Doric p[illegible] part-brick, part-stone, and a self-[illegible] combination of the Greek and Ro[illegible] styles. It is quietly grand, nobly [illegible] and testifies to this day to the glory [illegible] was Prussia.

In 1818 he designed a new *Schau-spielhaus* on Gendarmenmarkt, [illegible] to replace the theatre that had been [illegible]stroyed by fire. Its classic exterior [illegible] well matched by its sparse but functional use of space within.

His third major classical buil[illegible] most important for the city, wa[illegible] *Altes Museum*, with a wide frontage [illegible] a flat roof, like most of his work.

It was a rectangular building with [illegible] courtyards separated by a rotunda [illegible] metres tall.

The frontage consisted of 18 Ionic co[illegible]lumns. It was Athens on the Spree [illegible] common German epithet for Berlin [illegible] perfect harmony with the Roman Pan[illegible]theon.

Outside Berlin and Brandenburg [illegible] designed the main building of Le[illegible] University, the *Schlosswache* in Dr[illegible] the planetarium in Bonn, the *El[illegible]brunnen* in Aachen and *Burg R[illegible]stein*.

As a custodian of his country's ar[illegible]tectural heritage he kept an eye [illegible] churches in the Rhineland, on the [illegible] Nigra, and forestalled the demolition [illegible] the cloisters of Bonn minster.

Above all, he hoped to have Cologne cathedral, "this magnificent monument [illegible] stand free, surrounded by greenery [illegible] terraces extending to the banks of [illegible] Rhine.

He died on 9 October 1841 and [illegible] buried in Dorotheenstadt cemetery [illegible] the heart of what is now East Berlin.

Werner Stoedtkoll[illegible]

(Kölner Stadt-Anzeiger, 13 March 1[illegible])

Prolific composer

Georg Philipp Telemann, the composer, was born 300 years ago but not rediscovered until the early years of the 20th by Roman Rolland among others.

In his essay Memoirs of a Forgotten Master Rolland enthusiastically did Telemann justice after he had been overshadowed by Bach for over 160 years.

He had paled in significance but was suddenly rediscovered and, indeed, grew topical for the 20th century.

Telemann was born on 14 March 1681 the son of a Lutheran clergyman in Magdeburg. His talent for music was apparent at an early age.

He composed music for Baroque school dramas that marked the beginning of one of the most glorious and most fulfilled careers a musician ever had.

He composed the music for 46 passions and oratorios, 600 Church cantatas, many more secular ones, 40 operas, 600 orchestral suites, any amount of chamber music and lieder that are still extant.


The 19th century looked down on him as too prolific, but in his time Telemann was a popular musician and held in high repute. His artistic reputation well exceeded that of Johann Sebastian Bach.

He was offered the post of *Kapellmeister* at the court of Weimar but could afford to refuse the offer, having been famous and well-established in Frankfurt since 1712.

Bach had applied for the Weimar post but been refused.

Their paths crossed again in 1721 when Telemann was appointed chief musical director at Hamburg's five main churches and cantor at the Johanneum.

The year before, Bach had been turned down as organist at St Jacobi, the Hamburg church of St James, a much more modest appointment.



Georg Philipp Telemann
(Photo: Historia)

Bach was not accepted as cantor of St Thomas's, Leipzig, in 1722 until Telemann, whom Leipzig would like to have hired, had turned down the post.

Posterity rewarded him with oblivion. Bach held no grudge against the more successful musician. Telemann simply had a knack for looking after his better interests.

Maybe it was the result of a balanced, sanguine disposition to which Me[illegible]sohn later testified. Telemann, [illegible] found it easy to strike up contacts [illegible] success never made him arrogant.

He wrote no fewer than three [illegible] biographies. They clearly indicate [illegible] well-nigh naive delight with success [illegible] a frank admission to having borrowed ideas from other composers, especially French.

He was also able to make friends [illegible] other musicians. From 1702 until Han[illegible]del's death he was on the best of te[illegible] with the popular British composer, [illegible] borrowed motifs from Telemann's *[illegible]que à table* for operatic overtures of his [illegible]

From 1706 he was on good te[illegible] with Bach. He was godfather to Bach's son Carl Philipp Emanuel.

Telemann was a versatile musi[illegible] who created a style of his own [illegible] exposing German music to the influence of music from a variety of European countries.

On the threshold of classical music [illegible] used themes from Polish folk m[illegible] and, more particularly, French themes.

In the Italian comic opera style [illegible] *Pimpione or The Unequal Marr[illegible]* 1725, was a pioneering achievement [illegible] Germany, coming before Pergolesi's *Serva Padrone*.

Nowadays his chamber and orche[illegible] music are most popular, both bene[illegible] from the current tendency to [illegible] music on authentic period instruments.

But as a Church musician [illegible] composer of a 1744 St Luke's Passion [illegible] is currently an also-ran in comp[illegible] with Bach, whom he no less clearly [illegible] shone as a contemporary.

Yvonne [illegible]

(General-Anzeiger, 14 M[illegible])

■ GASTARBEITER

No easy answers on migrant workers

A recent congress organised by Arnoldshain Protestant Church academy, near Frankfurt, dealt with aliens policy in the 1980s.

It was attended by both Germans and foreigners and highlighted the difficulties in dealing with this problem.

Discussions on aliens policy are anything but easy today. Be it over a beer in the pub or among academics, Germans are usually in sharp disagreement over what is to be done on this issue.

Views range from rightist radical slogans like out with foreigners to humanitarian calls for full rights.

But the discussion becomes even more confusing when the foreigners themselves take part in it. The reason is simple. There is no such simple thing as foreigners.

There isn't even such a thing as just plain Turks. Of the 1.4 million Turks living in this country, 200,000 are Aleviles, people close to the Shiites; 150,000 are Kurds who are repressed back home and 30,000 are Christians. But most are Sunnites.

In addition, it is not only the intensity of religious faith that varies widely (usually it is less pronounced in Turkey than in other Middle East countries) but also political conviction.

The influence of radical Turkish groupings in this country is still limited, but it could well increase should these foreign workers feel discrimination is too much. All this does not make it any easier to discuss the matter.

The congress was marked by a frank discussion between Germans and foreigners. The issue in a nutshell was how the Federal Republic of Germany was to cope with the challenge of 4.5 million foreigners who wanted to stay in the country for good.

Must we ask of these people that they adapt to our standards and values and assimilate or should they be relegated to ghettos?

Should we perhaps accept that we have no choice but to live with these people in what must boil down to a multi-cultural society?

The discussion was relatively businesslike until three representatives of the Cologne-based Islamic Cultural Centre arrived unheralded.

Shortly thereafter, the representative of the Federation of Turkish Workers Associations walked out demonstratively, saying he could not stay under the same roof with fascists.

Even when the director of the academy pointed out that the congress was open to all comers, the representative remained unyielding and left.

It has long been known that the Koran lectures of the Islamic Cultural Centre, which is part of the Süleymanli movement, propagate a fundamentalist and militant form of Islam.

It is also known that a clergyman belonging to this sect a couple of years ago addressed a crowd of 3,000 promoting right-wing extremist and racist ideas.

On the other hand, the Turkish Workers Associations in this country are also are frowned upon at home.

They are close to the German Communist Party and, as their broadsheet *Turkei Information* shows, are more concerned with politics in Turkey than with the problems of their fellow-countrymen in Germany.

In view of this animosity between some of the foreigners' organisations, it takes a great deal of idealism to engage in a frank discussion with foreigners who live in Germany.

Many ask themselves if it is not utopian to attempt to help people who come from different civilisations to make their home here and become part of society.

Hans-Jürgen Schilling, secretary-general of the German Red Cross, warned against any humanitarian illusions. As unemployment became more acute it would become more difficult to make up for omissions in integrating these people during boom years.

He called for a gentle and humanitarian repatriation of some of the foreigners resident in Germany.

Few of the participants at the congress shared his pessimistic views on integration prospects. The congress was attended by some 70 people representing the academic world, the Churches, political parties, government authorities and a number of foreigners' organisations.

The former ombudsman for aliens' affairs, Heinz Kühn, was unable to express his views on the subject because he had opted out of the congress without giving a reason.

Protestant clergyman Jürgen Miksch, Frankfurt, adopted a Christian stance when he said:

"We brought these people to Germany to help us become even more affluent. Now those who want to stay here should be given equal rights.

"As a result, the Germans must come to terms with the fact that they will have to live a multi-cultural society.

"Though this is no patent solution for any aliens policy, it is a starting point from which to think further."

Other representatives of the Protestant clergy went along with this view but said that the integration of the various



ethnic groups should not be an assimilation that was foisted on them as happened in the late 19th century with the Poles who came to work in the Ruhr.

Instead, the foreigners who have already done their bit in adapting to German society, even if this was restricted to becoming punctual and observing traffic regulations, should be left at least some of their cultural identity. After all, this is no more than is granted Jews or Gypsies.

Miksch held that an aliens policy should never aim at one-sided but at mutual integration. Now, he said, it was the Germans' turn to adapt to a multicultural society. They must try to understand the foreigners and help remove barriers.

This calls for a great deal of patience, courage and willingness to learn, something that must start in kindergarten and at school and extend to cultural events, libraries and sports clubs and, last but not least, congregations.

Living together in a multi-cultural society must not only be seen as a burden but as an enrichment and a chance of expanding horizons, he said.

Another participant asked why so many of us have come to enjoy Yugoslav, Greek, Italian or Indonesian food while hesitating to familiarise ourselves with other aspects of foreign civilisations.

Miksch said that this lack of openmindedness could be due to the Germans' fear of losing their own cultural identity.

Practitioners representing the authorities, the business community and the trade unions did not contradict but said that we must take into account that this fear has something to do with figures.

If 4.5 million foreigners could make 57 million Germans insecure, what would happen should there be an economic crisis and the birth rate of Germans continued its decline?

Karl-Friedrich Eckstein, a staff member of the ombudsman for aliens' affairs, said that all possibilities of limiting the ratio of foreigners among us should be explored lest we lose what remains of our integration ability.

Count van Magnis of the Association of Hesse Employers said: "We must draw a line and there is no getting away from this."

The representative of the Trade Unions Federation avoided saying anything on the tolerance level for the ratio of foreigners in Germany but stressed that relations between Germans and foreign workers are not always good.

Some accuse their foreign fellow-workers of lacking esprit de corps and of continuing to work while the others attend staff meetings.

Moreover, he said, foreigners are more reluctant to join the unions.

German workers, he said, went up the career ladder because the foreigners were prepared to do the dirty work.

Even so, he held, it remains difficult to convince the Germans that the children of foreigners need costly preparatory courses before they can receive vocational training.

It appears that many German workers fear that the business community could attempt to alleviate the shortage of skilled labout by special courses for the children of foreigners.

One of these courses has been organised and financed by the Federal Labour Office in Nuremberg and has an enrolment of 15,000.

The trade unions' views on those measures are controversial although it is generally agreed that such courses contribute towards integration.

But such help towards integration was useless unless it was made use of by the foreigners themselves, said sociologist Professor Fürstenberg.

He said, on the basis of a study made in Berlin, that only some foreign workers are prepared to undergo a complete integration process, starting with learning German, via naturalisation to family relations with Germans.

The others, he said, only use the opportunity to make as much money as possible in as short a time as possible and then return home. These people want to live in cheap quarters and usually turn down better and more expensive housing.

A Frankfurt study also shows that the number of those willing to return home is greatest in low-rent ghetto housing where only seven per cent want to stay in Germany.

On the periphery of Frankfurt, which is less heavily populated with foreigners, the quota of those who want to stay is 30 per cent.

MIGRANT WORKERS
as percentage of working population

Ireland 0.4 · Britain 7.4 · Belgium 8.3 · Luxembourg 36 · 45 · 22 · France 11.1 · 0.4

CONDOR

According to Professor Fürstenberg, a great many of those who want [illegible] come integrated and stay here are [illegible] who have been in Germany for [illegible] time and find themselves caught [illegible] tween two cultures.

But they are hard put to arrive [illegible] clear-cut decision. As a result, it i[illegible] thing but humane to categ[illegible] demand that they become integr[illegible]

Instead, they should be given [illegible] portunity to integrate and th[illegible] should come on their own i[illegible] (better housing, further vocational [illegible] ing).

These people must be granted [illegible] right to shape their lives as they see [illegible]

It is not up to Germans to tell [illegible] ners what a "life worthy of [illegible] beings" is — as for instance by [illegible] them what the floor area of a [illegible] family home should be.

Professor Fürstenberg pointed to [illegible] migration studies in the United [illegible] which showed that minorities can [illegible] become emancipated unless they [illegible] an effort in that direction.

It was therefore pointless to [illegible] integration through financial as[illegible] Instead, the industrious and [illegible] should be given an opportunity [illegible] in their careers which would [illegible] initiative.

He added that he was moderately [illegible] timistic on integration but that [illegible] and conflict would have to be [illegible] ed.

There are indications that [illegible] workers are trying to find "socio-[illegible] mic niches" where they can [illegible] adaptation pressure.

Some start a business of their [illegible] such as a small tailoring shop, a [illegible] or a grocery. This provides the [illegible] family with a job which means [illegible] many of those belonging to the [illegible] generation of foreigners will no [illegible] seek work in industry.

Indeed, they show Germans a thing [illegible] two about running a small business [illegible] instance, no German greengrocer [illegible] make a point of polishing his apple[illegible]

This trend towards going into [illegible] ness will increase if foreigners [illegible] prived of career opportunities. Mo[illegible] the majority of the population cou[illegible] come dependent on a minority [illegible] certain activities develop into a mo[illegible] ly for foreign workers.

Such a vocational minority work[illegible] certain reserved jobs and envious [illegible] career opportunities of the others [illegible] turn into a social time bomb, [illegible] more so than the number of fore[illegible] in the country.

Konrad M[illegible]

(Frankfurter Allgemeine [illegible] für Deutschland, 1[illegible] Ma[illegible])

THE SCREEN

Geissendörfer directs five-hour TV film of Thomas Mann's *Magic Mountain*

Writer Thomas Mann felt in 1928 that plans to film *The Magic Mountain*, his novel set in a Swiss sanatorium, were too ambitious and would [illegible] abandoned.

Abandoned they were, until March [illegible]81, when Hans W. Geissendörfer [illegible]an in Montreux location filming of a [illegible]-hour film and TV screen version of [illegible] novel.

Director Geissendörfer, who also [illegible] the screenplay, is thus out to dis[illegible] the 1929 Lübeck Nobel laureate, [illegible], as Mann forecast, it will definitely be [illegible] screen epic.

Producer Franz Seitz is not keen on [illegible]perlatives such as the costliest and [illegible] ambitious German film ever made. [illegible] hope," he says, "we will be able to [illegible]anage on a budget of DM 19m."

Filming will take six months. An all-[illegible] cast and 70 extras will all work in [illegible] studio or on location in Montreux, Interlaken and Leysin in Switzerland and [illegible] Hamburg, Sylt and Berlin, Germany.

There will be a film crew of more [illegible] 100, and 100 costumes from Mu[illegible], Berlin, Zurich and Vienna will [illegible] recreate the turn-of-the-century set[illegible]ting.

In 1912 Thomas Mann visited his wife in a Davos sanatorium, where she was recovering from a slight lung complaint. The impressions he gained in three weeks there laid the groundwork [illegible] *his novel*.

In the novel Hans Castorp, a Hamburg shipowner's son, spends seven magic years up in the mountains. Played by Christoph Eichhorn, he originally plans merely to visit his cousin, played by Alexander Radszun, for a few weeks.

He is captivated by the strange world of the sick, the lust for life and love of people some of whom face death, and soon acclimatises himself.

Castorp indeed himself falls ill and in love with the beautiful Clawdia Chauchat, played by Marie-France Pisier, who spends her last night in the sanatorium with him.

Years later she returns, accompanied by a man of the world, Mijnheer Peepercorn, played by Rod Steiger, who later commits suicide in unusual circumstances.

A number of important scenes are being shot in the Montreux Palace, a grand old hotel that used to be patronised by Hemingway. Simenon still drinks a daily aperitif at the bar.

The Aga Khan and his family are regular quests. Oil sheikhs daily leave their wives behind here in closed suites before heading for the city lights.

Seitz has hired the conference and society rooms of the hotel for a week for 18,000 francs.

In the grand salon 10 make-up artists start at six in the morning making up 160 extras for the camera.

A buffet made of papier mache (because the spotlights are too hot) has been set in the bridge salon.

The film technicians' metal cases litter the club room floor, interspersing superb period furniture.

Rod Steiger, wearing a cape and a sailor's cap, sits patiently for hours at a time at a table in the impressive white and gold congress hall.

His big flare-up scene at dinner was filmed the day before; today all he has to do is watch Clawdia and Castorp kiss; he sees them in a mirror.

"Leave us alone, my child," is all he says, putting the hurt pride of an ageing man into these five words.

"Peepercorn is a man who values the gifts of life," says Steiger. "When he has reason to fear he is losing the ability to feel emotion, to love, he chooses death. I can understand him."

Steiger enjoys working in international productions. "Cooperation in the arts promotes sympathy and respect between peoples," he says.

He feels he is lucky to have a profession he loves. "What more does a man need to be satisfied? Good food, a good wife and clean sheets.

"I no longer give money a second thought. For me time is the most valuable currency in the world."

Marie-France Pisier says: "I represent love in the film. It is a fine task." A former discovery of Truffaut's, she enjoys playing in costume films: "Looking like the past is a kind of shield."

Geissendörfer spent weeks making sure of Christoph Eichhorn, his Hans Castorp. "I saw him in the film of Lion Feuchtwanger's *Exile* and knew from a short scene where he waits behind a door that he was the ideal actor for the part.

"My superstar had to ask 10 times for leave to take part in *The Magic Mountain*," the director says.

Eichhorn, an actor's son from Bochum, is 24, the same age as Castorp in the novel. "Hans Castorp is surprisingly like me," he says, "I have not had to work at the part at all."

Geissendörfer has been on his feet since six in the morning and is still not



finished at eight in the evening: "We still have to try out Alexander Radszun's death mask."

But a glass of champagne revives him. "This," he says, "is a breathtaking enterprise. It is not just a matter of illustrating a novel but of retelling a major tale.

"Many have felt *The Magic Mountain* was unfilmable. It is a challenge to handle the book and stimulate the viewer's imagination."

Asked whether his screen version will be true to Mann's novel, producer Franz Seitz says:

"Yes, as far as possible. In the novel the first day, the first week, take longer than an entire year later on. That will change slightly in the film."

(Lübecker Nachrichten, 15 March 1981)



MODERN LIVING

Are squatters symptomatic of an entire generation of disaffected youngsters?

The never-ending succession of squats and violent demonstrations can hardly fail to be rated alarming. What ever has become of the country?

The current system of government can fairly claim to be freer and more socially progressive than any of its predecessors in Germany.

Yet there is no mistaking the signs of unrest. Panes are smashed and paving stones lobbed and week for week police riot squads are in action somewhere or other.

Protest against nuclear power is by no means alone in erupting into violence. The cities too, from Hamburg and Hanover to Nuremberg and Freiburg, face the challenge of rebellious minorities.

Street fighting and riots have become the order of the day. In Berlin alone more than 100 houses have been occupied illegally by squatters.

The demonstrators are, for the most part, young people, which in itself is cause enough for alarm. It is no consolation to note that they are but a fraction of the younger generation.

Young people in general are showing increasing signs of being prepared to think in terms of militant disputes.

Breaking the law has, as countless squats have shown, come to be an everyday political weapon and is no longer even felt to be illegal.

That sets aside rules of the game that are indispensable if a constitutional system of government is to function. What motivates so many young people to lodge their protest in such an undemocratic and unruly manner?

Before getting down to the reasons why, two comments must first be made.

First, many squatters are socially committed. But by no means all move into empty houses out of sheer pity for the socially underprivileged.

Squatters themselves are by no means all socially disadvantaged. Many are punks and rockers motivated by nothing more than delight in bother and chaos.

Extremists and revolutionaries have hit on squatting as a new prospect of political violence. So have members of the nuclear protest movement.

It would be wrong, however, to say that street fighters and squatters are all birds of a feather, just as it would be wrong to view them as a terrorist movement in the making.

Second, grievous bodily harm, damage to property and squatting are still criminal offences. They are not a means of making good social damage.

They improve nothing, they are a breach of the legal peace and must accordingly be dealt with as provided for by the law. The state would forfeit control if it were to allow doubts to arise as to the illegality of such moves.

Sad to say, the wrong conclusions are often reached from these facts. It is wrong to imagine that unrest among so many young people can be ended by drafting in even more police, enforcing even more law and imposing even more draconian penalties.

The rioters include criminals and a number of mishaps that occur during demonstrations are, indeed, serious offences.

But to think solely in these terms is to relegate what is really upsetting to a minor role. What is so alarming is the large number of youthful rioters.

One is bound to wonder what it is that prompts so much contradiction and aggression among them that violence results.

Whether it suits or not, squatting must also be admitted to reflect social policy shortcomings of the present system.

There is a perceptible housing shortage, especially for large families, migrant workers and their families and social outsiders.

Yet more than 100,000 apartments are unoccupied, while subsidised housing is increasingly occupied by tenants no longer in the income bracket for which it was intended.

What, for that matter, about young people keen to share an apartment or self-help groups of youngsters who have succeeded in breaking with the drug habit and likewise need the steadying influence of an apartment of their own?

None of them are going to find one because they are not tolerated. Small wonder they make up a substantial proportion of squatters.

Their way of life is not in ke[...] with accepted cliches. Are they pe[...] up in arms partly because no-one [...] for them and the local authoritie[...] not enough to cater for their needs?

Young people are increasingly ke[...] opt out of the affluent society. The[...] tach no importance whatever to e[...] mic principles that govern life. Th[...] sire to make good economically do[...] interest them in the least.

How is it that there is such a la[...] interest in the state, so much so th[...] is virtually derided? Is this perhap[...] result of poor education and a la[...] models in the family, at school [...] politics?

Teachers who agitate rather tha[...] cate are nothing unusual. Neithe[...] politicians who pour scorn and de[...] on the armed forces.

Squatters talk in terms of war se[...] not national service, and when ask[...] name a dictator will surely mentio[...] neral Pinochet rather than Fidel Ca[...]

Who taught them to think along [...] lines or, to rephrase the question, [...] no-one object to them thinking [...] these lines?

Berlin mayor Hans-Jochen Vogel [...] squatting must not be viewed solely [...] criminal offence. It would be too ea[...] reverse the charges and say adults [...] blame, but questions must noneth[...] be asked.

Dr Vogel says one of the reason[...] the current wave of unrest among [...] young is the discrepancy between [...] and deeds in politics.

If this is so, police duties are b[...] means superfluous but they are ne[...] that matter, the most important [...] of dealing with an irksome proble[...]

Bernd Nellesen

(Hannoversche Allgemeine, 14 March 19[...])

Home life regains glamour, Bonn report suggests

The housewife's role is increasingly appreciated, according to a Bonn Youth, Family Affairs and Health Ministry report. And high time too!

The housewife-only, looking after home and family and not going out to work, has for too long been a self-deprecating figure at the tail end of the emancipation queue.

To some extent, of course, she has only herself to blame, having allowed herself to be pushed to one side by her more militant sisters.

She has even herself subscribed to the view that self-respect and equal rights can only be gained by going out to work as well as running the home.

With a sigh she has returned to housework and caring for the family, feeling a little inadequate.

The self-sacrificing housewife has often been cast in the role of counterpart to the emancipated working woman. She is a woman who has devoted her life to helping others in the family circle.

Accepting this role and maybe even finding fulfilment in it is no longer in keeping with the way women's libbers would like to see their sex.

Feminists intent on equal rights tend to regard the little woman housewife as an oppressed and stunted figure. This is a conclusion swiftly and readily reached.

Yet an increasing number of women now claim that true womanhood can only be experienced in charge of a home, with the freedom to do what one wants, to arrange one's own timetable, to concentrate on the children and on individual fulfilment.

The laments have been toned down in volume. The housewife has regained equilibrium. Dependence on a husband and his earnings is no longer regarded as a stigma.

The continual worries associated with looking after children and the monotony of household chores are felt to be less of a burden than they were only a few years ago.

Envy of the working woman and her independence has grown less marked than it used to be.

At times it does, admittedly, sound a little exaggerated when a housewife emphasises the part she has played in promoting her husband's career or helping the children with homework or music lessons.

Such comments are always accompanied by a clear hint that the working woman cannot perform these roles and indeed shirks them.

But this life of sacrifice has to have been worthwhile and must bear fruit. It would be a catastrophe if the children were to prove failures at school, if her husband were not to gain promotion and if domestic bliss were to show signs of wear and tear.

Yet a housewife need not limit herself to the home. Many women politicians at both local and national government level these days list housewife as their occupation and have not the slightest compunction in so doing.

Women are playing an increasingly large role in politics at the local government level, where they benefit from experience and knowledge of local circumstances.

They are not hampered by career commitments and have time and energy to devote themselves wholeheartedly to the most varied interests, lobbies and pep groups.

The women's lib movement has strengthened the position of women everywhere. Housewives too have gained in self-esteem and self-assurance.

They now know that it is not force of circumstances that drives them into isolation but their own inertia. Instead of lamenting they must do something about it.

"All told," the Ministry report says, "women's right to decide freely on either career or family life is increasingly acknowledged."

It sounds as though women have at long last come of age, so to speak, enjoying legal safeguards and capable of reaching decisions of their own.

In theory this may well be true, but no-one will want to deny that the practice is another matter.

Freedom of choice is a fine-sounding but inaccurate description of the care and consideration, not to say conformity, that are usually expected of a woman when she reaches her decision.

Is she to opt for a family or a career or both? Seldom is the man prepared to stay at home and look after the children while the woman improves her job prospects.

More and more young couple[...] sharing the chores, but the wom[...] bears the brunt of day-to-day resp[...] bility and drudgery.

Housewives may no longer ha[...] accept any old chore that is fobbe[...] on them but few have yet gone to t[...] trouble of demanding a wage for lo[...] after the home.

Whose pocket is it going to come [...] of, anyway? Many housewives would [...] the other hand, welcome indepen[...] social security provisions.

They feel it is most illogical for p[...] sion rights only to be shared betw[...] husband and wife when a divorc[...] granted.

The Allensbach pollsters reckon w[...] ing housewives are generally more [...] isfied than those who do not go ou[...] work, and the better qualified wor[...] wives are, the more satisfied they [...] be.

Better qualified housewives ought [...] gically to be more satisfied too. But [...] still think much less clearly than b[...] of a lifelong career plan.

Women tend to marry and start a [...] mily, which means the end of wo[...] for a living, and after this natural b[...] it is very difficult to start again fr[...] scratch careerwise.

Fewer women than in the past [...] and carry out their lives as housew[...] only from start to finish, but those [...] do need not necessarily spend a life[...] in the background, as it were.

A housewife's lot can lay the gro[...] work for self-determination in life a[...] life extending far beyond the [...] confines of the home.

Maria Fr[...]

(Frankfurter Allgemeine Ze[...] für Deutschland, 14 March 19[...])

SPORT

Bright gymnastics hopes in world title year

[...]or Carmen Rischer the 1981 nation[...]al championships in rhythmic gym[...]tics in West Berlin were a great dis[...]ointment after a distinguished career. [...]ey were to have been a final [...]mph prior to retirement but there [...] no stopping the up-and-coming [...]ngsters, especially Regina Weber [...]m Lüneburg.

Miss Weber outperformed her in al[...]st every event in this world cham[...]nship year, even without competition [...]m Anke Abraham, also from Lüne[...]rg.

Miss Abraham, last year's champion, [...]s sideline by meniscus with six weeks [...] go the championships, which was a [...]d blow to more than her Berlin cham[...]onship hopes.

It meant a semester out of action in [...] career as a physical education stu[...]nt and a lost opportunity of defending [...]r national title and starring in the [...]orld event.

As for Miss Rischer, she was the loser [...] a war of nerves. She had to make do [...]th the individual title in the clubs and [...] title shared with Miss Weber in the [...]sh.

This particular variety of gymnastics, [...]hich ropes, hoops, clubs and sashes [...] the individual disciplines, is now an [...]lympic discipline.

The girls wore gaily coloured kit, flo[...]ws in their ballerina hairstyles, used colourful equipment and were generally a sight for sore eyes.

After the two-day championships at Schöneberg sports hall chief coach Livia Medilanski was delighted:

"Four girls are in international form but the youngsters show even greater promise. A round dozen look like proving first-rate."

She is naturally over the moon, especially as women gymnasts in the better-known version of gymnastics are not doing so well at present.

Besides, rhythmic gymnastics has long been regarded as a sport that cannot be taken seriously, with the result that financial backing has been poor for the Cinderellas of the gymnasium.

Now it is an Olympic event chief coach Medilanski has hopes that are nothing if not ambitious:

"Gymnastics for girls ought to be the same as football for boys, but we still have a long way to go, of course."

Progress may well be made this autumn in Munich, where the world championships are to be held, and Berlin was undeniably an important run-up to the gymnastics *Oktoberfest*.

A 1,000-strong crowd in the Schöneberg hall shared the happiness, excitement and expectations of the competitors as they watched the four Olympic disciplines, the rope, hoop, clubs and sash.

It was clear who was making the running but the national team has yet to be selected. A squad of nine girls are being coached, but only six will star in the team event.

Rumour has it that chief coaches Medilanski (choreography and composition) and Christiansen (rehearsals) are working on an ambitious and outstanding routine. But the coaches have everything under wraps. They would prefer the girls not to be the victims of exaggerated hopes and expectations. As the championships came to a close the 29 graceful competitors and their aides headed for the exit. What was on their minds? Was a good night's sleep all they wanted, plus an opportunity of missing out gym the next morning? Were their heads still in a spin at such a marvellous championships?

Or had the championships been a bitter disappointment, for that matter? Maybe, but the overriding thought in most girls' minds was a good meal.

The 29 individual competitors and 66 group members had spent weeks slimming their way into their skin-hugging kit.

The idea of a four-course meal was such an overwhelming prospect that few of them had thoughts of anything else for the moment.

Gerda Riehm

(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung für Deutschland, 16 March 1981)



Regina Weber (Photo: Bongarts)

Germans quit Formula 1

So much for German drivers in Formula 1 motor racing. In the wake of Rolf Stommelen and Hans-Joachim Stuck Jochen Mass, 35, has called it a day.

Born in Dorten, near Munich, he worked three years in the merchant navy before becoming a mechanic and trying his hand at motor racing in 1968.

Interviewed by telephone in Monte Carlo, where he now lives, he said: "No more Formula 1 for me."

The main reason for his decision to retire will have been Arrows team manager Jackie Oliver's choice of Siegfried Stoohr, a German-born Italian, to drive the No. 2 car together with Ricardo Patrese of Italy.

Stoohr bought himself into the team, whereas Mass, who in recent seasons has been sponsored by the Warsteiner brewery, could no longer find a sponsor.

Warsteiner withdrew after squabbling in Formula 1 racing and Mass has been unable to find financial backing to ensure a place in Formula 1.

"I lacked the cash other drivers have to bring with them to keep Formula 1 going," he explained. He reckons it costs DM4m a year to run a grand prix stable.

"I have been in Formula 1 for eight seasons but it doesn't sadden me to call it a day, although I would naturally have preferred to end my career on a happier note."

He ruled out any possibility of entering for the German grand prix at Hockenheim on 2 August: "My decision is final."

Mass is returning to endurance trials such as Le Mans and the German circuit where he established the reputation that led him to try his hand at Formula 1.

He will probably be driving a Porsche. Since 1973 he has competed in 97 grand prix races, finishing among the first six on 29 occasions and driving a McLaren to victory in Spain in 1975.

He was lucky enough to survive in a dangerous game with little more than a few knocks and bruises.

Günther W. Einfeldt/dpa

(Kölner Stadt-Anzeiger, 11 March 1981)

German player beats Borg

A cynic once said that West German tennis players would never face Björn [...]rg in the court because they would [...] have been eliminated before the No. [...] seed had played his first game in the [...]urnament.

Rolf Gehring disproved this theory [...]th a vengeance on 12 March in Brus[...]ls, where he not only played Borg but [...]at him in the DM 300,000 Belgian [...]and prix.

He beat the five-time Wimbledon [...]ampion 7-6, 7-5 in the last 16 at [...]ussels. Gehring comes from Neuss, [...]ar Cologne.

The only German ever to have beaten [...]rg before was Hajo Plötz of Berlin, [...]d that was six years ago when Borg [...]s 18 and at the beginning of his ca[...]reer.

In Gehring's case it is hard to tell [...]hether he is at the beginning of a great [...]reer or at the end of a more modest [...]e, so dramatic have been his ups and [...]owns in recent seasons.

Only in the past few months has he [...]peared to be at all consistent, and for [...]is the credit is clearly due to his per[...]nal manager and coach Harald El[...]schenbroich.

He is the first German player to be [...]anaged in this way and there can be [...] missing the difference now Gehring [...] assisted and accompanied by the for[...]er Davis Cup player.

Gehring pays Elschenbroich a fee and [...]penses out of his own pocket.

It is a job on which Elschenbroich [...] only be congratulated. In terms of [...]chnique there is nothing he needs to teach Gehring, who is first-rate at every stroke and has no clear weaknesses in this department.

In tactics and psychology Gehring nonetheless stands to benefit from Elschenbroich's 20 years in international tennis. He has already done so.




Rolf Gehring (Photo: Werek)

Under new management Gehring has grown a tougher customer. He no longer gives up so readily when he is no longer in the lead.

Elschenbroich has accomplished this partly by coaching him to improve his legwork at the baseline.

So it is hardly surprising that Gehring had this to say after beating Borg:

"I ran for my life, especially in the second set when I realised I stood a chance."

Borg was impressed. All he said was: "Congratulations, Rolf, you played well."

Gehring had shown he was in fine fettle by beating José Luis Clerc, No. 8 in the world ratings, in the Davis Cup match against Argentina in Munich.

At Munich after this Davis Cup encounter he decided that all you need is to keep cool, calm and collected; the others are no supermen either.

Rolf Gehring is a reserved kind of person not given to displays of friendship, but now he has gained a self-confidence that was not always his.

He often felt slighted, unfairly so, as he reckoned, and he left no-one in any doubt now he felt about it.

I recall a King's Cup game against Hungary in Ludwigshafen where he was only a substitute. That so riled him he said: "I'll show you all one of these days."

But it was a while before he did so, and he only really succeeded in Brussels, six years later.

Hans Jürgen Pohmann

(Die Welt, 14 March 1981)